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NO IFS, ANDS OR BUTTS: BIG TOBACCO IS FIGHTING 
FOR ITS LIFE AGAINST A NEW BREED OF PLAINTIFFS 
ARMED WITH MOUNTING EVIDENCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The federal government has estimated that ten million people 
have died of smoking-related illnesses. l That number continues to 
grow at a rate of 400,000 deaths per year, making it the number 
one preventable cause of death in the United States.2 Moreover, $50 
billion is spent each year in direct medical costs,3 and over five mil-
lion years of potential life are lost annually from smoking.4 One 
might expect that cigarettes would be regulated, perhaps even 
banned, or that tobacco companies would be held financially liable 
for such extensive damages. Instead, tobacco is a $45 billion a year 
industry5 that has boasted for decades that it has not paid a dime 
for such claims.6 Since the 1950s, over three hundred consecutive 
claims have been defeated by "big tobacco."7 The industry has flour-
ished by selling a product that causes many of its consumers to be-
come sick and even die. 
1. See Mark Curriden, The Heat is On, 80 ABA j. 58, 58 (1994). 
2. See CDC's Tobacco Information & Prevention Sourcepage (visited Sept. 5, 1997) 
<http://www.cdc.gov /nccdphp/ osh/ tobacco. hUn>. 
3. See id. 
4. See id. 
5. See Henry Weinstein & Jack Nelson, Untested Theory Becoming Tobacco Firms' Top 
Threat Courts, LA TIMES, Aug. 4, 1996, at AI, available in 1996 WL 11255519. 
6. See Curriden, supra note 1, at 58. However, Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. (Lig-
gett) without admitting wrongdoing, has paid out $1 million as part of a 
March 1996 settlement with five states. See Liggett Pays First Part of Tobacco Settle-
ment, WALL ST. j., April 9, 1996, at AI0, available in 1996 WL-WSJ 3097975. The 
settlement with Florida, Massachusetts, Mississippi, West Virginia, and Louisi-
ana provides that Liggett will also pay another $4 million over the following 
ten years, as well as 2.5% of the company's pre-tax profits for the next twenty-
five years. See Milo Geyelin, Liggett, Five States Set Pact Covering Treatment of 
Smoking-Related Illnesses, WALL ST. j., Mar. 18, 1996, at A3, available in 1996 WL-
WSJ 3095173. The payments are to help defray the cost of treating Medicaid 
recipients with smoking-related illnesses. See id.; see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 246-58, 261-66; see also infra note 278 and accompanying text. 
7. See Curriden, supra note 1, at 58. 
99 
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This Comment explores the various legal theories utilized by 
plaintiffs in the past forty years of tobacco litigation. This Comment 
also explains why plaintiffs have been unsuccessful and the tobacco 
industry has been victorious. Further, this Comment examines the 
most recent battles, including actions brought by states to recover 
Medicaid expenses in treating smoking-related illnesses. 
In 1996, Maryland joined the fight,S and like many other states,9 
Maryland is relying on the growing evidence of internal documents 
and insider testimony. This new evidence, in conjunction with les-
sons learned from past losses, may provide the current army of 
plaintiffs with the tools necessary to reach long-awaited success. The 
fall of the tobacco industry may be just around the corner. 
II. HISTORY OF TOBACCO LITIGATION 
A. First Wave: 1950s 
In 1954, in the midst of early studies identifYing a link between 
smoking and cancer,IO Eva Cooper began what has been termed 
"the three waves" of tobacco litigation 1 1 by suing RJ. Reynold's To-
bacco CO. (RJ. Reynolds) for the wrongful death of her husband.12 
Cooper alleged that her husband contracted lung cancer from 
smoking Camel cigarettes and that he had relied upon representa-
tions in particular newspaper, television, and radio advertisements 
stating that Camel cigarettes were healthy and harmless.13 RJ. Reyn-
8. See Complaint, State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 96122017/CL 211487 (Md., Bal-
timore City Cir. Ct.) (filed May 1, 1996). 
9. See State Tobacco Information Center (visited Sept. 16, 1997) <http:/ / 
stic.neu.edu>. The following thirty-eight states have also filed suits to recover 
Medicaid expenses: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id. Puerto Rico has also filed suit. See 
id. 
10. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. 
REv. 853, 856 (1992). Early findings were first published in The Journal of the 
American Medical Association and later in The Reader's Digest. See id. 
11. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 10, at 854. The phrase "three waves" refers to the 
more active periods of litigation as follows: (1) 1954 to about 1965, (2) 1983 
through 1992, and (3) 1992 to the present. See Elsa F. Kramer, Tobacco Defense 
Strategies, REs GESTAE, May 1996, at 24. 
12. See Cooper v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d 464, 465 (1st Cir. 1958). 
13. See, e.g., id. at 466. The alleged representations included that "20,000 doctors 
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olds, the manufacturer of Camel cigarettes, easily defeated this the-
ory of deceitl4 by asking Cooper which particular ads were relied on 
and showing the court that none of those ads included the alleged 
misrepresentations. 15 
This result was typical of the first wave cases. During this early 
period, only about 150 cases were filed l6 based on various theories, 
including deceit,n breach of warranty!8 and negligence}9 Only ten 
of these cases went to trial, and every plaintiff was ultimately 
defeated.20 
In Lartigue v. RJ Reynolds,21 Frank Lartigue's widow filed suit 
against a group of cigarette makers, alleging breach of warranty and 
negligence.22 Lartigue died of lung cancer after fifty-five years of 
smoking the defendant's cigarettes.23 Lartigue's widow alleged a 
causal connection between his smoking and his cancer.24 However, 
the jury did not agree and sided with the tobacco companies.25 
Lartigue's widow appealed the jury instructions on the nature 
of the implied warranty of wholesomeness.26 The trial judge ex-
plained that "such implied warranty does not cover substances in 
the manufactured products, the harmful effects of which no developed 
human skill or foresight can [avoid}."27 According to these instructions, 
if the jury found that the tobacco companies did not foresee that 
cigarettes could cause cancer at the time that Mr. Lartigue's cancer 
began to develop, the verdict had to be in favor of the companies.28 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 
say that 'Camei' cigarettes are healthful" and that they "are harmless to the 
respiratory system." [d. 
14. See id. at 465. 
15. See id. at 466. 
16. See Kramer, supra note 11, at 24; Rabin, supra note 10, at 857. 
17. See, e.g., Cooper, 256 F.2d at 465; see also supra text accompanying notes 13-16. 
18. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 859; see also infra text accompanying notes 21-27. 
19. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 859. 
20. See B&W Loses First Tobacco Liability Case in Fla., SELECI' FEDERAL FIUNGS NEW-
SWIRES, Aug. 9, 1996, available in WL Fed File, HTH News [hereinafter B&W]. 
21. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963). 
22. See id. at 22. 
23. See id. Lartigue started smoking Picayune cigarettes, made by Liggett, as a 
nine-year-old child; as he got older, Lartigue also smoked Liggett'S King Bee 
tobacco and RJ. Reynold's Camel cigarettes. See id. 
24. See id. at 23. 
25. See id. at 22. 
26. See id. 
27. [d. at 39 (alteration in original). 
28. See id. 
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this instruction was fair and consistent with Louisiana law.29 The 
court of appeals noted that those who started smoking before the 
"great cancer-smoking debate" could not claim reliance on repre-
sentations that cigarettes had no carcinogenic element.3o 
Similar jury instructions were upheld in Ross v. Philip Morris & 
CO.31 In Ross, the plaintiff attempted to recover for his injuries32 by 
asserting breach of implied warranty, negligence, fraud, and deceit 
against cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris. 33 In addition to a gen-
eral denial, Philip Morris asserted as defenses the statute of limita-
tions, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence.34 At trial, the 
jury found for Phillip Morris.35 
On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the sufficiency of the jury 
instructions, arguing that Phillip Morris owed an absolute duty of 
wholesomeness, thereby making knowledge and reasonableness ir-
relevant.36 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit acknowledged that strict liability could be imposed under cer-
tain conditions.37 However, under the facts of this case, liability had 
been properly limited.38 As the court of appeals explained, absolute 
liability emphasizes that only the manufacturer can know about a 
product's contents.39 However, when Ross began smoking,40 Philip 
Morris was in no better position than consumers to know of the 
link between cancer and smoking.41 . 
In Green v. American Tobacco CO.,42 plaintiffs came closest to vic-
tory during the first wave of tobacco litigation.43 In Green, a jury 
29. See id. 
30. Id. at 3940. 
31. 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964). 
32. For nearly twenty years, Ross smoked Phillip Morris's cigarettes, sometimes up 
to four packages a day, until undergoing surgery for throat cancer. See id. at 5. 
Ross underwent a laryngectomy, neck dissection, and tracheotomy. See id. 
33. See id. The fraud and deceit count was not submitted to the jury because Phil-
lip Morris's motion for summary judgment on that issue was granted. See id. 
34. See id. The statute of limitations defense was eliminated in a pretrial confer-
ence. See id. Also, the assumption of risk and contributory negligence defenses 
did not go to the jury. See id. 
35. See id. at 4-5. 
36. See id. at 8. 
37. See id. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. 
40. In 1934, Ross began smoking only the defendant's cigarettes. See id. 
41. See id. 
42. 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc). 
43. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 861. 
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found that Edwin Green, Sr. died of lung cancer caused from smok-
ing Lucky Strike cigarettes.44 However, this case spanned more than 
a decade and reached appellate courts five times before the applica-
ble state law could be determined. At the center of the controversy 
was the implied warranty of reasonable fitness and the applicability 
of strict liability. Although the plaintiff established causation,45 the 
jury ultimately found for the tobacco company.46 The tobacco com-
pany's victory was partially due to the jury instructions47 which pro-
vided, like those in Lartigut8 and RoSS,49 that the implied warranty 
does not cover substances the company could not foresee as 
harmful. 50 
On certified question from the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of the implied warranty of merchantability.51 The supreme court 
found that the manufacturer's "actual knowledge or opportunity for 
knowledge of a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrele-
vant."52 Without concluding on the particular facts of the case, the 
court held that there was no foreseeability limitation on liability 
under an implied warranty of merchantability.53 The court also 
found that American Tobacco could be found absolutely liable for 
breach of implied warranty of fitness of cigarettes, which caused 
cancer in the plaintiff, even though the company did not or could 
not know of the potential harm.54 
The plaintiff's success on certification was short-lived, however, 
because the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed one of its prior Green decisions en bane.55 Relying on the rea-
soning of an earlier dissent,56 the court held that an implied war-
44. See Green, 409 F.2d at 1167 (Coleman, J., dissenting). 
45. See id. (Coleman, J., dissenting). 
46. See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1963). 
47. See id. at 170. The trial judge instructed the jury that an "implied warranty 
does not cover substances in the manufactured product the harmful effect of 
which no developed human skill or foresight can afford knowledge." Id. 
48. See supra text accompanying notes 21-29. 
49. See supra text accompanying notes 3141. 
50. See Green, 154 So. 2d at 170. 
51. See id. 
52. Id. at 170. 
53. See id. at 172. 
54. See id. 
55. See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969). 
56. See id. at 1166 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (citing Green v. American Tobacco 
Co., 391 F.2d 97, 106 (5th Cir. 1968». 
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ranty guarantees that a product is "reasonably wholesome or fit."57 
Because the product in this case, Lucky Strike cigarettes, was not 
defective or adulterated,58 the appellate court held that the manu-
facturer could not be liable.59 
In addition to issues of implied warranty, first wave juries also 
addressed plaintiffs' claims of express warranty. In Pritchard v. Liggett 
& Myers Tobacco CO.,60 the jury found that Otto Pritchard's cancer 
was caused by smoking cigarettes manufactured by Liggett & Myers 
Tobacco Co. (Liggett). Nonetheless, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit held Liggett was not liable because it 
had not made any" 'express warranties upon which the plaintiff re-
lied and by which he was induced to purchase' the cigarettes. "61 
Pritchard, like many others, also used a negligence theory 
against Liggett.62 The complaint included allegations that Liggett 
represented its cigarettes as safe when they actually contained harm-
ful ingredients that made them unsafe for human consumption.63 
Pritchard contended that because Liggett knew, or should have 
known, that substances in the product were cancer-producing, it was 
negligent in failing to warn consumers of the potential harms of 
smoking.64 
Liggett argued that at the time Pritchard contracted cancer 
there was no evidence supporting the theory that smoking caused 
lung cancer.65 This debate over the causal link between smoking 
and cancer never went to the jury.66 The district court granted Lig-
gett's motion for a directed verdict, holding that "no substantial evi-
57. Green, 391 F.2d at 113. 
58. See id. at 111. 
There has never been presented by the evidence any contention that 
Lucky Strike cigarettes were more dangerous or had a greater pro-
pensity to cause lung cancer than cigarettes bearing other brand 
names. Nor has there been any contention that the cigarettes which 
Mr. Green smoked contained any foreign substance, or any spoiled, 
contaminated or other substandard ingredient which caused his in-
jury and death. 
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1963). 
59. See Green, 391 F.2d at 111. 
60. 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966). 
61. Id. 
62. See id.; see also Ross v. Philip Morris, 328 F.2d 3, 13 (8th Cir. 1964). 
63. See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 294 (3d Cir. 1961). 
64. See id. at 299. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. at 295. 
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dence ha[d] been offered to support a verdict against the defend-
ant on any theory of negligence. "67 
On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit held that the evidence presented a jury question.68 
Thus, the issue of whether it was reasonable for Liggett to have for-
gone further testing69 on the effects of smoking, and whether Lig-
gett should have warned of cancer-causing ingredients, should have 
been submitted to the juryJo On retrial, the jury decided in favor of 
Liggett.7l Liggett successfully persuaded the jury that Pritchard "had 
assumed the risk of contracting lung cancer."72 
Tobacco companies had traditionally defended smokers' suits 
by simply denying all claims made by the plaintiffs and asserting the 
statute of limitations. Consistently, tobacco companies had argued 
cigarettes did not cause cancer or, alternatively, that they did not 
know that cigarettes could cause cancer.73 As noted above, in Lar-
tigue, RJ. Reynolds denied any causal connection between smoking 
and cancer.74 In Rnss, Philip Morris claimed that as a matter of law, 
there was insufficient evidence to submit the question of causation 
to the jury.75 Nevertheless, Philip Morris did not challenge the jury 
instructions which stated that even if the cigarettes caused cancer, 
the defendants could not be held liable unless "reasonableness" 
and "developed skill or foresight" could have anticipated the 
harmJ6 
Note that during this first wave of cases the central doctrine 
was not causation, but rather foreseeabilityJ7 Although juries found 
that the deaths at issue were due to cancer caused by smoking the 
manufacturer's cigarettes, they generally decided in favor of the 
67. [d. 
68. See id. at 300. 
69. Evidence existed that Liggett had conducted one test on the effects of smok-
ing on human beings, concluding that their cigarettes had no harmful effect 
on "nose, throat and accessory organs." [d. at 300. However, a doctor who ex-
amined study participants did note harmful effects from smoking. See id. 
70. See id. 
71. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 862. 
72. [d. 
73. See Lartigue v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19,23 (5th Cir. 1963); Ross 
v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 10 (8th Cir. 1964); Green v. American To-
bacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166, 1169 (5th Cir. 1969). 
74. See Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 23. 
75. See Ross, 328 F.2d at 7. 
76. [d. at 6-7. 
77. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 860·61. 
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manufacturers based on the lack of foreseeability of harm to the 
plaintiffs.78 During this time, juries determined that the requisite 
human skill and knowledge were not sufficiently developed to pro-
vide the insight that smokers could and did contract cancer from 
smoking.79 
The conclusions reached by judges and juries during the first 
wave illustrate the general lack of understanding regarding the 
health risks associated with smoking. The great cancer-smoking de-
bate was only in its early stages and it was believed that smokers 
merely assumed the risk of harm.80 In addition, the general public 
widely accepted the notion that tobacco companies lacked the 
knowledge that their products caused lung cancer.8l 
Little was it known that not only did tobacco companies have 
the knowledge that plaintiffs like Pritchard had alleged,82 but that 
they took active measures to conceal their findings from the public. 
Recent evidence has shown that tobacco company executives, by de-
nying that evidence proved a connection between smoking and can-
cer, created the atmosphere within which these earlier cases were 
heard and lost by plaintiffs.83 What subsequent plaintiffs learned 
from these early defeats was that they would have to produce evi-
dence that the tobacco companies had knowledge of the harmful 
effects and concealed it. 
B. Second Wave: 19805 
The second wave of tobacco litigation began in the 1980s,84 a 
period in which more information linking smoking to cancer be-
came available.85 Even though another 150 cases were filed, plain-
tiffs remained unsuccessfu1.86 Plaintiffs continued to assert many of 
the same theories as in the first wave of litigation, such as breach of 
warranty. However, they also undertook a new focus with other 
theories. 
78. See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966); see 
also supra text accompanying notes 32-34, 3946; Green, 409 F.2d at 1167. 
79. See Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 19; Green, 409 F.2d at 1166. 
80. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30, 72. 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 4041. 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64. 
83. See infra text accompanying notes 215-16, 22744. 
84. See B&W, supra note 20; Kramer, supra note 11, at 24. 
85. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 864. The Surgeon General's Report of 1964 was re-
leased, and legislation requiring warning labels on cigarette packages was en-
acted. See id. 
86. See Kramer, supra note 11, at 24. 
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In Roysdon v. RJ Reynolds,87 the plaintiffs contended that RJ. 
Reynolds's cigarettes were defective and unreasonably dangerous.88 
During the first wave of cases tobacco companies defeated this the-
ory by convincing the fact finder that the harm caused from smok-
ing was not foreseeable. 89 Now, however, tobacco companies com-
bined the foreseeability doctrine with the consumers' increased 
level of knowledge to avoid liability.90 
In Roysdon, the court explained that under Tennessee law, a de-
fective product was one that is "unsafe for normal or anticipatable 
handling and consumption."91 Therefore, consumer knowledge 
about the inherent risks of smoking must be considered when de-
termining whether cigarettes are defective. 92 At trial, the Roysdons 
did not argue that the cigarettes were incorrectly manufactured or 
had dangerous impurities.93 Thus, the court found that RJ. Reyn-
olds's cigarettes did not pose any risks that were not already known 
by consumers.94 Therefore, the product could not be defective.95 
Regarding the Roysdon's claim that RJ. Reynold's cigarettes 
were "unreasonably dangerous," the court again found that public 
knowledge about the risks and dangers of smoking prevented a 
finding in favor of the Roysdons.96 Under Tennessee law,97 a prod-
uct is "unreasonably dangerous" if it is more dangerous than an or-
dinary consumer with common knowledge would think it to be.98 
The court found that knowledge that "smoking is harmful to health 
is widespread and can be considered part of common knowledge. "99 
Thus, because the information was available to the Roysdons, the 
court held the issue could not go to the jury.l00 Roysdon illustrates a 
shift in the use of strict liability by plaintiffs. Rather than focusing 
on foreseeability, as was done in the first wave of cases, plaintiffs re-
87. 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988). 
88. See id. at 232. 
89. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59 for a discussion of Green. 
90. See infra text accompanying notes 91-100 for a discussion of Ruysdon. 
91. Ruysdon, 849 F.2d at 236. 
92. See id. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. 
96. See [d. 
97. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(8) (1980), cited in Ruysdon, 849 F.2d at 236. 
98. See Ruysdon, 849 F.2d at 236. 
99. [d. (quoting Roysdon v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1192 
(E.D. Tenn. 1985». 
100. See id. 
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lied on the dangerous nature of the product. 101 While the unsuc-
cessful plaintiffs in Roysdon used the "unreasonably dangerous" 
method, others tried to persuade courts to apply the risk-utility 
test. 102 
In Gianitsis ·v. American Brands, Inc.,103 Nickolas Gianitsis brought 
suit against several tobacco companies claiming that he contracted 
lung cancer as a result of smoking the defendant's cigarettes. 104 He 
attacked the tobacco industry with the risk-utility testl05 which had 
been proposed fifteen years earlier in an article by Professor 
Wade. 106 Under this doctrine, a manufacturer could be liable for in-
juries if the product's risks outweigh its social value or usefulness.107 
Thus, a plaintiff could maintain a strict liability claim without hav-
ing to prove a defect in the product. 108 However, the Gianitsis court 
did not accept the "expansive doctrine of strict product liability."I09 
Although the court found that the plaintiffs claim was consistent 
with the risk-utility theory,110 it held that such theory was not recog-
nized under New Hampshire law. 111 
A similar result occurred in Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp.,112 where the court declined to apply the risk-utility test. 1l3 The 
Miller court noted that although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
mentioned the risk-utility test in a prior case,114 it did not intend to 
101. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 866. 
102. See infra text accompanying notes 105-08 for a discussion of the risk-utility 
test 
103. 685 F. Supp. 853 (D.N.H. 1988) (applying New Hampshire law). 
104. See id. 
105. See id. at 855. 
106. See id. at 857. Wade proposed that whether a product is defective is more 
properly an issue of negligence, while whether a product is unreasonably dan-
gerous is a products liability issue. See J. W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Li-
ability for Products, 44 MISS. LJ. 825, 837 (1973). 
107. See Gianitsis, 685 F. Supp. at 857 (discussing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 649 F. 
Supp. 664, 670-71 (D.NJ. 1986» (citing O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 462 A.2d 
298 (NJ. 1983». 
108. See id. 
109. Id. at 859. 
110. See id. at 857. 
111. See id. at 859. The court found that New Hampshire courts have adopted the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, which the court interpreted as requiring an 
allegation of a defect. See Gianitsis, 685 F. Supp. at 858. 
112. 679 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
113. See id. at 489. 
114. See id; see also Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., 528 A.2d 590 (Pa. 1987). The Lewis 
court mentioned three approaches to design defects as follows: (1) the con-
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adopt this approach and would not do so now. 115 
During the second wave of cases, the tobacco industry contin-
ued to deny that cigarettes were hazardous1l6 and asserted the "free-
dom of choice" argument. ll7 Ironically, the tobacco companies used 
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, as 
amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, (the 
Cigarette Acts) 118 to strengthen this defense, as well as advance pre-
emption arguments. 119 
In Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp.,120 the Supreme Court of Michigan, 
while addressing contributory negligence in an asbestos case, ac-
knowledged that consumers have the freedom to choose, and they 
therefore assume the risks resulting from their choices. 121 In Brisboy, 
the decedent was an asbestos worker who smoked two packs of ciga-
rettes a day for thirty years and died of lung cancer.122 The jury 
found that the decedent's exposure to asbestos, as well as his smok-
ing, concurrently caused his fatal cancer.123 The court held that the 
"risk of developing lung cancer is within the scope of the risk as-
sumer expectations standard; (2) the risk-utility standard; and (3) the Azz.arello 
standard. See Lewis, 528 A.2d at 593; see also Miller, 679 F. Supp. at 487. Under 
the consumer expectation standard, a product may be defective if it does not 
perform as an ordinary consumer would expect during normal use. See Miller, 
679 F.Supp. at 487. The risk-utility test provides that a product is defective if 
the risk of harm outweighs the benefits of the characteristic at issue. See id. 
The Azz.arello standard may result in a finding of defectiveness if the product 
leaves the manufacturer's control without any feature that makes it safe for its 
intended use or with any feature that makes it unsafe for its intended use. See 
id. 
115. See Miller, 679 F. Supp. at 489. 
116. See Curriden, supra note I, at 60. 
117. [d.; Kramer, supra note 11, at 24; see Rabin, supra note 10, at 870; see also id. at 
873 (explaining that the tobacco companies place responsibility for harm on 
the user, instead of the industry, while still denying risk to the user). 
118. See Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 133140 (1994». Four years later, Congress amended the 1965 Act by enact-
ing the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. See Pub. L. No. 91-222, 
84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.c. §§ 133140 (1994». The 1969 
amendments strengthened the warning label language and prohibited adver-
tising in any medium under FCC regulation. See id.; see also Cipollone v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 515 (1992) (explaining the 1969 amendments). 
119. See Curriden, supra note 1, at 60. 
120. 418 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1988). 
121. See id. at 655. 
122. See id. at 651. 
123. See id. at 655. 
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sumed by a smoker."124 Thus, the decedent's smoking habit consti-
tuted negligence. 125 Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, 
the defendant, an asbestos manufacturer, would only be liable for 
damages causally related to its own negligence. 126 
While analyzing the Cigarette Acts, the court in Forster v. RJ 
Reynolds Tobacco Co.127 noted that Congress warned people that "they 
should not smoke if they value their health but [left] the decision 
whether to smoke up to them."128 RJ. Reynolds argued that the Cig-
arette Acts preempted not only129 Forster's failure to warn claim, but 
also any state claim based on defective condition or design. l3O RJ. 
Reynolds further argued that permitting such state tort actions 
would conflict with the Cigarette Acts' compromise,131 which allows 
cigarettes to be sold if they are packaged with the federally-
mandated warning label. 132 The Forster court held that the Cigarette 
Acts impliedly preempted state tort claims based on the duty to 
warn,133 but did not preempt other claims to the extent that they 
were not based on the duty to warn. l34 
In Rite v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco CO.,135 the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania also concluded that the Cigarette Acts preempted post-
1965 claims136 based on the failure to warn. J37 Much of the court's 
124. [d. 
125. See id. 
126. See id. at 655-57. 
127. 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989). 
128. [d. at 658. 
129. Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, Congress can preempt state 
common law and statutes with federal legislation. See, e.g., Dewey v. RJ. Reyn-
olds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1243 (NJ. 1990). State law preemption can 
occur by express language, implied congressional intent, or to the extent that 
state law conflicts with the federal regulation. See id. Instances of conflict pre-
emption include (1) where compliance with both state and federal laws would 
be physically impossible and (2) where state law is an obstacle to the purposes 
of a federal regulation. See id. 
130. See Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 659. 
131. The Farster court interpreted the Cigarette Acts to represent a "compromise 
between the national interest in protecting health by not smoking and the na-
tional interest in protecting commerce and the country's tobacco economy." 
[d. at 658. 
132. [d. at 660. 
133. See id. 
134. See id. at 661-63. Thus, 'Forster's claims of unsafe design, misrepresentation, 
and breach of warranty were not preempted. See id. 
135. 578 A.2d 417 (Pa. Super. 1990). . 
136. "The Act does not specifically provide for retroactive preemptive effect." Far-
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reasoning came from its analysis of the decision rendered by the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 
Inc.138 The Hite court agreed with the Cipollone court's conclusion 
that state tort claims alleging violations of warning obligations, 
other than those required by the federal act, would conflict with the 
Cigarette Acts and disturb the balance created by Congress. 139 
Although several courts effectively precluded plaintiffs' claims 
by allowing the preemption defense,140 not all courts accepted this 
defense. The court in Dewey v. RJ Reynold's Tobacco Co. 141 chose to 
conduct its own analysis of the issue142 rather than relying on previ-
ous interpretations. The Dewey court concluded that the Cigarette 
Acts did not preempt the plaintiff's claims.143 
The Dewey court acknowledged that many federal circuit courts 
approved of the rationale in Cipollone, but noted that some of those 
decisions were reversals of lower cour1:$ that had determined that 
the Cigarette Acts were not preemptive. 144 The Dewey court con-
cluded that the Cigarette Acts do not expressly, impliedly, or by "ac-
tual conflict" preempt state law claims.145 The court found that the 
goals of the Cigarette Acts were to (1) inform the public that smok-
ing may be dangerous to one's health by requiring warning labels 
and (2) protect commerce and the economy.l46 The court rejected 
ster, 437 N.W.2d at 663. 
137. See Hite, 578 A.2d at 420. 
138. 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986). 
139. See Hite, 578 A.2d at 419-20. 
140. See s:upra text accompanying notes 129-34 for a discussion of FQTSter. See supra 
text accompanying notes 135-39 for a discussion of Hite. 
141. 577 A.2d 1239 (NJ. 1990). 
142. See id. at 1244. 
143. See id. at 1251. 
144. See id. at 1246. See generally, e.g., Forster v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 
N.W.2d 691, 696-701 (1988), rev'd, 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989) (finding that 
the Cigarette Acts did not "immunize the tobacco industry from tort liability," 
and citing four factors as follows: (1) the Cigarette Acts do not explicitly pre-
empt state court claims, (2) state police powers are involved, (3) the legislative 
history of the Cigarette Acts shows that Congress did not intend to preempt, 
and (4) preemption would destroy all methods of recourse for plaintiffs). 
145. See Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1247. 
146. See id. at 1248. The statement of policy and purpose explains: 
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to 
establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette la-
beling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smok-
ing and health whereby-(I) The public may be adequately informed 
that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a 
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RJ. Reynold's argument that because state tort claims frustrate the 
second goal, such an "obstacle" is preempted. 147 Instead, the court 
observed that permitting such claims would advance the public pol-
icy goals of providing individuals with the opportunity to present 
claims and receive compensation where appropriate. l48 
III. TOBACCO LITIGATION TODAY 
A. Third Wave: 1992 to Present 
The split on the preemptive effect of the Cigarette Actsl49 was 
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc. 150 which marked the beginning of the current, third wave 
of tobacco litigation. 151 Rose Cipollone started smoking in 1942 and 
died of lung cancer in 1984.152 Her son brought suit against Liggett, 
alleging breach of express warranties, failure to warn, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, and conspiracy.153 Liggett contended that the 
Cigarette Acts, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 
of 1965 (the 1965 Act) and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking 
Act of 1969 (the 1969 Act), preempted such claims, thus safeguard-
ing it from liability.154 
Prior to Cipollone, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit ruled that the 1965 Act preempted most actions 
against tobacco manufacturers after 1965.155 However, as noted by 
the Supreme Court, the court of appeals did not specify which of 
warning to that effect on each package of cigarettes; and (2) com-
merce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maxi-
mum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not im-
peded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and 
advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between 
smoking and health. 
15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). 
147. See Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1248. 
148. See id. at 1249-50. 
149. See supra note 118 (explaining origins of the Cigarette Acts). 
150. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
151. See generally Rabin, supra note 10, at 874. 
152. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,' 508 (1992). Rose Cipollone 
and her husband filed suit on August 1, 1983. See id. at 509. When she died in 
1984, her husband continued the claim until his death after the trial. See id. 
Their son maintained the Supreme Court action. See id. 
153. See id. at 508. 
154. See id. at 510. See generally supra note 118 (explaining origins of the Cigarette 
Acts). 
155. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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Cipollone's claims were preempted. 156 On remand, the district court 
complied with the appellate court ruling and prohibited Cipollone 
from relying on Liggett's advertising and public relations conduct in 
proving his failure to warn, express warranty, fraudulent misrepre-
sentation, and conspiracy to defraud claims. 157 However, even with 
these limitations, Liggett prevailed at trial. The jury concluded that 
Liggett breached its duty to warn and express warranties before 
1966, and thus the jury awarded Cipollone $400,000 in damages. 15s 
On appeal, however, the trial court's decision was reversed, and a 
new trial was ordered. 159 Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to address the preemption issues regarding the 1965 and 
1969 Acts. 160 
The Supreme Court issued three distinct holdings. First, the 
Court held that state law damage actions were not preempted by 
Section 5 of the 1965 Act. 161 Second, the Court determined that the 
1969 Act preempted Cipollone'S failure to warn claim. 162 Third, the 
Court held that claims based on express warranty, intentional fraud 
and misrepresentation, or conspiracy were not preempted by the 
1969 Act. 163 In reaching these conclusions, the majorityl64 relied on 
a narrow rule of statutory interpretation. 165 The Court looked only 
156. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 512. 
157. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp 664, 673-75 (D.N]. 1986). 
158. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 554-55 (3d Cir. 1990), afi'd 
in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992). The jury found Rose Cipollone 80% responsible 
for her injuries because she voluntarily smoked cigarettes, which was a known 
danger. See id. 
159. See id. at 583. 
160. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 512. 
161. See id. at 519-20. However, state and federal rule making bodies were pre-
empted from "mandating particular cautionary statements." [d. at 520. 
162. See id. at 524 ("Petitioner's claims are preempted to the extent that they rely 
on a state-law 'requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to ... advertising 
or promotion.' "). Claims based on Liggett's testing or research, however, 
wen~ held not to be preempted. See id. at 524-25. 
163. See id. at 531. 
164. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion for Parts I, II, III, and IV in which 
he was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Blackmun, 
Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Justice White. See id. at 507. Justice Ste-
vens also wrote a plurality opinion for Parts V and VII, in which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice White joined. See id. 
165. See id. at 517. The Court relied on the principle of "expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius." [d. In statutory interpretation, this means that "Con-
gress[ional] enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a stat-
ute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted." [d.; see also 
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to the express language of the acts166 "in light of the presumption 
against preemption."167 
In a dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Kennedy and 
Souter, stated that he believed the preemption language could not 
be interpreted in isolation, but must be read in the context of the 
whole statute. 168 Dissenting in part, he turned to the legislative his-
tory169 and determined that Congress did not intend "to leave plain-
tiffs who were injured as a result of cigarette manufacturers' unlaw-
ful conduct without any alternative remedies."17o Therefore, Justice 
Blackmun would have held that none of the common-law remedies 
was preempted by the 1969 Act. l7l 
In a second dissenting opinion Justice Scalia, joined by Justice 
Thomas concluded that all of Cipollone's common-law claims were 
preempted. 172 Justice Scalia explained that the Court erred in apply-
ing a narrow rule of construction to the preemption provisions. 173 
Instead, the proper rule of construction required that the statutory 
language be given its "ordinary meaning."174 
Cipollone illustrates the progress made by plaintiffs over the past 
two waves of litigation. In Cipollone, the plaintiff was able to fight for 
over ten years, taking the industry to the Supreme Court with nu-
merous claims, at a cost of $6.2 million dollars.175 During the first 
period, most cases were brought by "frontiersmen," lone personal 
injury lawyers176 who were often ill-prepared and at times found to 
be incompetent. 177 These early battles taught plaintiffs that re-
sources needed to be pooled and new theories espoused. 178 
George j. Annas, Health Warnings, Smoking, and Cancer-The Cipollone Case, 327 
NEW ENG. j. MED. 1604, 1605 (1992) (explaining the Court's majority and con-
curring opinions). 
166. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517. 
167. Id. at 518. 
168. See id. at 535 (Blackmun, j., dissenting in part). 
169. See id. at 539-41 (Blackmun, j., dissenting in part). 
170. Id. at 541 (Blackmun, j., dissenting in part). 
171. See id. at 542 (Blackmun,j., dissenting in part). 
172. See id. at 548 (Scalia, j., dissenting in part). 
173. See id. at 545-46 (Scalia, j., dissenting in part). 
174. Id. at 548 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
175. See Curriden, supra note 1, at 59. 
176. See Rabin, supra note 10, at 857. 
177. See id. at 860. 
178. See Curriden, supra note 1, at 60. 
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1. Class and State Actions 
The pooling of resources is now a more widespread practice. 
By combining resources, plaintiffs are now in a better position to 
handle the demands placed on them by tobacco company 
attorneys. 179 
On March 29, 1993, Castano v. The American Tobacco CO.180 was 
filed. 181 This class action suit was filed on behalf of all nicotine de-
pendent people in the United States. 182 The broadly defined class, 
which potentially included over forty million people,183 was repre-
sented by a team of over sixty law firms.l84 The Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit noted that "the gravamen of their complaint is ... 
[a] novel and wholly untested theory"185 based upon new evi-
dence. 186 The plaintiffs alleged that the tobacco companies knew 
that nicotine was addictive, and that the tobacco companies not 
only failed to inform consumers, but manipulated nicotine levels 
with the intent of increasing the addictive nature of their prod-
UCt. 187 This general theory was the central theme throughout the 
causes of actions asserted-fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresen-
tation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of war-
ranty, and strict product liability. 188 
179. The tobacco industry is notorious for hiring several highly skilled attorneys for 
each case, never settling a claim, and creating a mountain of work for plain-
tiffs. See id. at 59. 
180. 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995). 
181. See id. at 548. In May 1996, the class was decertified. See Castano v. American 
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996). The court of appeals found that 
the district court failed to consider the effects of variations in state law and 
how such a trial would be conducted. See id. at 740. 
182. See Castano, 160 F.R.D at 549. The district court defined the class as: 
(a) All nicotine-dependent persons in the United States, its territo-
ries, possessions and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, who have 
purchased and smoked cigarettes manufactured by the defendants; 
(b) the estates, representatives, and administrators of these nicotine-
dependent cigarette smokers; and, (c) the spouses, children, relatives 
and "significant others" of these nicotine-dependent cigarette smok-
ers as their heirs or survivors. 
[d. at 560-61. 
183. See Kramer, supra note 11, at 24. 
184. See George J. Annas, Tobacco Litigation As Cancer Prevention: Dealing with the 
Devi~ 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 304, 304 (1997). 
185. Castano, 84 F.3d at 737. 
186. See id. at 748. 
187. See Castano, 160 F.R.D. at 548. 
188. See id. 
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The first class action suit to go to trial, on June 1, 1997, signifi-
cantly differs from past cases in that the injured parties are non-
smokers.189 The class is comprised of 60,000 non-smoking flight at-
tendants who contend that exposure to second-hand smoke while 
working in airplane cabins has caused them to suffer from various 
illnesses. 19o The class is asking for $5 billion in damages. 191 
The blameless nature of the non-smoking plaintiffs strips the 
tobacco industry of its "freedom-of-choice" defense. 192 Instead, the 
defendant is expected to argue that other contaminants could have 
caused the flight attendants' injuries. 193 The cigarette companies will 
also argue that the flight attendants' claims should be tried individ-
ually, rather than as a class, because of the numerous differences 
among the class members.194 
The presiding Florida circuit court judge, however, has decided 
to move forward with the trial as a class action. 195 A jury will first de-
cide whether the industry can be responsible for the injuries suf-
fered by the class. 196 If the industry is found liable, then the jury will 
evaluate individual claims.197 
On May 23, 1994, Mississippi was the first state to sue the to-
bacco industry in order to recover Medicaid funds that were spent 
treating smoking-related illnesses. 198 Since then, thirty-eight more 
states, including Maryland, have filed similar suits. l99 The plaintiffs 
now are represented by government attorneys working with exper-
ienced products liability lawyers in an effort to "establish for the 
first time that the tobacco companies have as much [of an] obliga-
tion to compensate the states for damages caused by their .product 
189. See Donald P. Baker, Nonsmoker's Suit Presents New Challenge for Industry; Tobacco 
Makers Can't Use 'Freedom-of Choice Defense,' WASH. POST, May 31, 1997, at A3, 
available in 1997 WL 11585888. 
190. See id. One named plaintiff, Norma R. Broin, was stricken with cancer which 
resulted in the removal of a lung. See id. 
191. See id. 
192. See id.; see supra text accompanying notes 117-26. 
193. See Baker, supra note 189, at A3. 
194. See id.; see also infra text accompanying note 202 (providing example of to-
bacco companies asserting the same argument in actions brought by states). 
195. See Baker, supra note 189, at A3. 
196. See id. 
197. See id. 
198. See Ct. Hears Tobacco Challenge to Miss Atty Gen'l Suit, SELECfED FEDERAL FILINGS 
NEWSWIRES, Sept. 4, 1996, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS database. 
199. See supra note 9. 
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as an oil company has for the cost of cleaning up a spill. "200 
Plaintiffs hope to achieve success by utilizing a theory of con-
spiracy. The states contend that since the early 1950s tobacco com-
panies have known that cigarettes are hazardous to the health of 
smokers, but suppressed information about the dangers of nicotine 
and conspired to prevent the development of a safer cigarette.2OI 
Nonetheless, tobacco companies continue to be armed with sev-
eral defenses. They contend that states should still be required to 
show evidence on an individual basis, as they would in a traditional 
personal injury case.202 If the cases move forward, the tobacco com-
panies have also threatened to depose thousands of Medicaid recipi-
ents.203 Tobacco companies also argue that states are not damaged 
because they have received millions of dollars from taxes on ciga-
rettes.204 Some tobacco companies have even gone so far as to claim 
that they have actually saved the states money. Specifically, they 
have asserted that Medicaid and Social Security benefits no longer 
need to be provided to smokers due to their early deaths.205 
a. Maryland State Action 
On May 1, 1996, the State of Maryland filed suit against the to-
bacco industry seeking $13 billion in damages.206 The State's com-
plaint sets forth thirteen counts, including fraud and deceit, breach 
of warranties, negligence, and strict liability.207 Like other state ac-
tions, Maryland is also utilizing a conspiracy count against the in-
dustry. Specifically, the State accuses the tobacco companies of en-
tering into an agreement to suppress information on the dangers of 
smoking, including the addictive effects of nicotine, and preventing 
the marketing of a safer cigarette.208 In addition to these theories of 
liability, Maryland, in its sovereign capacity, also accuses the tobacco 
companies of violating state antitrust and consumer protection 
acts.2OO These theories distinguish the State's case from suits brought 
200. Weinstein & Nelson, supra note 5, at AI. 
201. See id. 
202. See id. 
203. See id. 
204. See id. 
205. See id. 
206. See Complaint, supra note 8, Phillip Morris, (No. 96122017/CL 211487); Federal 
Claims Asserted, Remand of Maryland Case Improper, Industry Says, MEALEy's LITI-
GATION REpORT: TOBACCO, July 18, 1996. 
207. See Complaint, supra note 8, at 76-99, Phillip Morris (No. 96122017/CL 211487). 
208. See id. at 80. 
209. See id. at 13. 
118 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 27 
by individuals. 
In the first count of its complaint, Maryland alleges that the to-
bacco companies violated Section 13-301 of the Maryland Consumer 
Protection Act.210 Section 13-301 proscribes "any unfair or deceptive 
trade practice" with respect to the sale of consumer goods.211 The 
State contends that the tobacco companies continue to engage in 
"unfair or deceptive trade practices" in their sale and promotion of 
tobacco products.212 The illegal conduct alleged is five-fold: (1) mis-
leading Maryland consumers about the industry's knowledge on the 
health effects of smoking; (2) making statements that cigarettes 
have a benefit that they do not; (3) misrepresenting their connec-
tion to the Tobacco Industry Research Committee/Council for To-
bacco Research, claiming it was controlled by independent scientists 
when it was actually an industry promotional tool; (4) failing to 
state material facts concerning health hazards and the· addictiveness 
of nicotine; and (5) promoting the sale of tobacco to minors.213 
The tobacco companies are also accused of violating Section 
11-204 of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act in counts two, 
three, and four of the State's complaint.214 The tobacco companies 
are accused of entering a "contract, combination and conspiracy" 
that resulted in the restraint of trade and commerce and willfully 
monopolizing the cigarette market.215 The conspiracy is said to in-
clude the following: (1) an agreement to suppress independent 
smoking research; (2) the destruction of research results illustrating 
health hazards; (3) public relations campaigns intended to deceive 
the public; (4) a joint effort to make false statements to Congress; 
and (5) an agreement to stop the development of a "safer" ciga-
210. See id. at 76. 
211. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 13-303 (1990). 
212. Complaint, supra note 8 at 76, Phillip Morris (No. 96122017jCL 211487). 
213. See id. at 76-77. 
214. See id. at 79-85. 
215. Id. Specifically, the tobacco companies are accused of violating the Maryland 
Antitrust Act, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-204(a) (1)-(2) (1990). The Ma-
ryland Antitrust Act provides: 
Id. 
(a) Prohibited conduct.-A person may not: (1) By contract, combina-
tion, or conspiracy with one or more other persons, unreasonably re-
strain trade or commerce; (2) Monopolize, attempt to monopolize, 
or combine or conspire with one or more other persons to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce within the State, for the pur-
pose of excluding competition or of controlling, fixing or maintain-
. ing prices in trade or commerce. 
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rette.216 At the same time, the State contends suppression of infor-
mation on the adverse health effects of smoking and development 
of a safer cigarette was an exercise of the tobacco companies' mo-
nopolistic power.2I7 Maryland maintains that it has suffered great in-
jury as a result of the industry's anti-trust violations, specifically, 
higher rates of illness and death and the costs associated with 
them.218 
Maryland and other states alleging antitrust violations and con-
sumer fraud may prevail where plaintiffs invoking common-law rem-
edies have failed. This point is illustrated by the trial court's recent 
decision on the tobacco companies' motion to dismiss. The only 
counts to survive were the consumer protection and antitrust 
claims.219 
As plaintiffs, states avoid the problems of a "blameworthy plain-
tiff"220 which individuals faced in many earlier suits, making it easier 
to focus on the misconduct of the tobacco companies.221 As Minne-
sota Attorney General Hubert Humphrey, III explained upon filing 
Minnesota's action, "[P] revious lawsuits have said the tobacco com-
panies should pay because their products are dangerous. This suit 
says they should pay because the conduct . . . is illegal. "222 
b. Minnesota Model 
Because the Maryland case is still in its early stages, the parties 
should look to the State of Minnesota case223 for an indication of 
what lies ahead. Many view the Minnesota claim as a model because 
216. See Complaint, supra note 8, at 80, Phillip Morris (No. 96122017jCL 211487). 
217. See ro. at 85. 
218. See id. at 86. 
219. See State v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 96122017jCL 211487 (May 21, 1997). The 
court dismissed Maryland's common law counts, holding that the State has 
"no right ... to assert claims in its own name against defendants as alleged 
tortfeasors for the harm defendants allegedly caused ... to third party smok-
ers." Id. at 11 (emphasis added). The court explained that under the doctrine 
of subrogation, the State would need to bring such claims in the name of 
each individual Medicaid recipient. See ro. 
220. Richard A. Daynard, The Third Wave of Tobacco Products Liability Cases, TRIAL, 
Nov. 1994, at 34, 37-39. 
221. See ro. at 39; see also supra note 215. 
222. State of Minnesota, Private Insurer Sue Tobacco Companies, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 
1994, at A4, available in 1994 WL 2435397. Minnesota also asserted antitrust 
and consumer protection claims. See Complaint, State v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 
No. Cl-94-8565 (Minn., Ramsey County Dist. Ct.) (filed Aug. 17, 1994). 
223. See Complaint, supra note 222, Phillip Morris (No. Cl-94-8565). 
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it was filed early and is steadily moving forward. 224 So far discovery 
has provided Minnesota with more than ten million pages of docu-
ments from the tobacco industry, as well as access to databases com-
piled by tobacco companies' law firms during the defense of prior 
suitS.225 The tobacco companies seek a comparable volume of 
paperwork in requesting State Medicaid payment records and 
reports.226 
2. New Evidence 
Many of the newly-uncovered documents that states are relying 
upon are the result of relatively recent leaks by industry insiders. In 
1994, thousands of pages of documents from Brown & Williamson 
surfaced.227 An anonymous source, known only as "Mr. Butts," pro-
vided Stanton A. Glantz, Ph.D, at the University of California at San 
Francisco, with approximately four thousand pages of information 
that spanned thirty years.228 Representative Henry Waxman, chair-
man of the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, 
also possessed many Brown & Williamson documents.229 In addition, 
the estate of a former British American Tobacco officer made other 
industry papers available.230 
These valuable documents revealed that Brown & Williamson 
has known for over thirty years that nicotine is addictive and smok-
ing can cause cancer.231 Because tobacco companies' research on 
the health effects of smoking was often far ahead of the rest of the 
224. See Weinstein & Nelson, supra note 5, at AI. 
225. See id. These documents are thought to be copies of those taken by Merrell 
Williams, a former paralegal for one of Brown & Williamson's attorneys. See id. 
226. See id. 
227. See James S. Todd et aI., The Brown and Williamson Documents: Where Do We Go 
From Here?, 274 JAMA 256, 256 (1995). 
228. See id. 
229. See id. Brown and Williamson tried to retrieve these documents from Repre-
sentative Waxman by obtaining a subpoena from the Superior Court for the 
District of Columbia. See id. at 257. However, the subpoenas were later 
quashed by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See 
Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406, 414-15 (D.D.C. 1994). The judge ex-
plained that to accept Brown & Williamson's argument, that the papers were 
stolen and therefore should be returned, would go against the law, equity, 
and the public interest because the documents may be evidence of the to-
bacco company's deception. See Stanton A. Glantz et aI., Looking Through a Key-
hole at the Tobacco Industry: The Brown and Williamson Documents, 274 JAMA 219, 
223 (1995). 
230. See Todd et aI., supra note 227, at 256. 
231. See Glantz, supra note 229, at 219. 
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medical community, Brown & Williamson had advance knowledge 
of the hazards but decided to hide this information from the pub-
liC.232 Instead, Brown & Williamson and other tobacco companies 
chose to tell the public that a connection between smoking and ill-
ness had not yet been established.233 For example, in a 1963 memo, 
Brown & Williamson's general counsel, Addison Yeaman, stated, 
"We are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug 
effective in the release of stress mechanisms. "234 Over three decades 
later, the Chairman and CEO of Brown & Williamson testified 
before the Health and Environment Subcommittee that nicotine is 
not addictive.235 
In addition to documentation, some individuals have also come 
forward with potentially damaging information. Jeffrey Wigand, the 
former head of research and development at Brown & William-
son,236 has revealed to the media and the Department of Justice that 
companies knew that cigarettes were harmful and kept this informa-
tion from the public.237 Wigand contends that Brown & Williamson 
had knowledge of the addictive nature of nicotine and the health 
hazards of many additives.238 The legal staff at Brown & Williamson 
232. See Todd et al., supra note 227, at 256. By the early 1960s, Brown & Williamson 
understood that nicotine was addictive. See Glantz, supra note 229, at 220. It 
was not until 1979 that the Surgeon General reached the same conclusion. See 
id. 
233. See Todd et al., supra note 227, at 256. 
234. Glantz et aI., supra note 229, at 220; Curriden, supra note 1, at 61. 
235. See Glantz et aI., supra note 229, at 220. At these hearings, chaired by Repre-
sentative Waxman, U.S. Food and Drug Administration Commissioner David 
Kessler pointed to evidence of industry use of their research and patents in-
volving nicotine manipulation. See Daynard, supra note 220, at 34. The CEOs 
of seven major tobacco companies responded by swearing that they did not 
believe nicotine was addictive. See id. 
236. See Marie Brenner, The Man Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR, May 1996, at 
170, 172. Wigand, who has a Ph.D. in endocrinology and biochemistry, worked 
for health care companies such as Pflzer and Johnson & Johnson before be-
coming a Brown & Williamson employee in 1989. See Elizabeth Gleick, Jeffrey 
Wigand Doesn't Live Here Anymore, TIME, Mar. 11, 1996, at 57, available in 1996 
WL 8824909. He was flred from Brown & Williamson in March 1993. See Bren-
ner, supra, at 179. 
237. See Elizabeth Gleick, Where There's Smoke . .. Jeffrey Wigand is Making Incendiary 
Charges about the Tobacco Industry, Which is Out to Bum Him, TIME, Feb. 12, 1996, 
available in 1996 WL 8824677. 
238. See Brenner, supra note 236, at 173. Wigand brought a report from the Na-
tional Toxicology Program, on the carcinogenic effect of the additive couma-
rin, to the attention of a Brown & Williamson executive and suggested remov-
ing the additive from their products. See id. at 178-79. The executive's 
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reportedly sent sensitive documents involving their in-house re-
search overseas and told their staff to avoid making lists or 
memos.239 The company was hiding information that they con-
tended was not true or did not exist. 
As the "highest-ranking tobacco executive ever to tum whistle 
blower,"24o Wigand is viewed by many plaintiffs as the witness that 
can "personalize" allegations against the tobacco companies.241 An 
insider such as Wigand may be better able to convince a jury when 
explaining the conduct and motives of a tobacco company.242 
All of this evidence will assist plaintiffs with their current battle 
that focuses on deceit, fraud, and conspiracy committed by the to-
bacco companies.243 As cases progress, more information will be un-
covered and shared with other plaintiffs. The Minnesota case has al-
ready exposed a 1973 research report from RJ. Reynolds which 
states that a competitor's success was the result of 'deliberate and 
controlled' nicotine enhancing methods."244 At the University of 
California at San Francisco, an archive has been established to 
house Brown & Williamson and other tobacco control documents. 
Access to these documents is available on the Intemet.245 
3. Settlement with Liggett 
In March 1997, Liggett & Myers Tobacco, the smallest tobacco 
company in the United States, entered into a settlement agreement 
with twenty-two states that had cases pending against the company 
and confirmed the information disclosed by recent leaks.246 Liggett's 
response was that such action would hurt sales. See id. at 179. On his own initi-
ative, Wigand then investigated other additives and their effects. See id. The re-
search and development concerning nicotine was handled by Brown & Wil-
liamson's overseas departments. See id. at 178. 
239. See Brenner, supra note 236, at 177. 
240. Elizabeth Gleick, Tobacco Blues, TIME, Mar. 11, 1996, at 54, available in 1996 WL 
8824908. 
241. See id. at 55. 
242. See id. 
243. See Curriden, supra note 1, at 61. 
244. Weinstein & Nelson, supra note 5, at AI; see also text accompanying note 201. 
245. See Tobacco Control Archives (last modified Aug. 4, 1997) <http://ga-
len.library. ucsf.edu:80 / tobacco>. 
246. See John Schwartz & Saundra Torry, Tobacco Firm Settles 22 State Suits; Liggett 
Group Admits Cigarettes'Dangers, Agrees to Release Data and Testify, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 21, 1997, at AI, available in 1996 WL 11255519. However, Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield of Minnesota, a plaintiff in the Minnesota suit, has refused to be a 
party to the settlement. See id. 
1997] No Ifs, Ands, or Butts 123 
chief executive officer, Bennett LeBow, agreed to make a statement 
that smoking causes various diseases, including lung cancer.247 In ad-
dition, Liggett conceded that cigarette companies target young peo-
ple,248 meaning those who are under the legal smoking age. 
In addition to these concessions, Liggett agreed to pay twenty-
five percent of its pre-tax profits for the next twenty-five years to the 
states.249 The money is to be used to treat individuals with smoking-
related illnesses and for an anti-smoking campaign.250 The com-
pany's cigarette packages are to be labeled with a stronger warning 
that states "smoking is addictive."251 
What is most valuable to current and future plaintiffs are the 
documents Liggett has agreed to release. Liggett will tum over ap-
proximately 250,000 pages of documents, some of which implicate 
the entire tobacco industry.252 Those documents that involve other 
tobacco companies and the "Committee of Counsel,"253 however, 
may be protected by the "'joint-defense' privilege."254 Therefore, 
rather than turning these documents over to the plaintiffs, Liggett 
is sending them to courts in the twenty-two states.255 Judges will then 
decide whether the documents contain non-legal matters or evi-
dence of a crime or fraud, in which case they would not be pro-
tected by the privilege.256 
In exchange for Liggett's cooperation, the twenty-two states 
have dropped their cases against Liggett. In addition, all present 
and future plaintiffs have been barred from suing the company, ex-
cept for states which have not yet filed suit.257 These terms also ap-
247. See Milo Geyelin & Suein L. Hwang, Liggett to Settle 22 States' Tobacco Suits-
Company Agnes to Warn Smokers of Addiction, Turn Over Internal Data, WALL ST. j., 
Mar. 21, 1997, at A3, available in 1997 WL-WSJ 2414032. 
248. See id.; Schwartz & Torry, supra note 246, at AI. 
249. See Schwartz & Torry, supra note 246, at AI. 
250. See id. 
251. Geyelin & Hwang, supra note 247, at A3. 
252. See Milo Geyelin, Liggett Settlement Puts Spotlight On Industry s Top Legal Group, 
WALL ST. j., Mar. 24, 1997, at B5, available in 1997 WL-WSJ 2414052. 
253. The industry contends that the committee was merely a way for a group of in-
house counsel to discuss common legal topics. See id. A 1964 report detailing 
tobacco industry operations alleges, however, that the committee determined 
various policy issues such as research and public relations. See id. 
254. See id. 
255. See id. 
256. See id. 
257. The Attorney General of Arizona, Grant Woods, explained that they were not 
sure if the prohibition on other suits could work. See id.; see also Geyelin & 
Hwang, supra note 247, at A3. 
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ply to any company Liggett may merge with, except Philip MorriS.258 
The settlement agreement improves the plaintiffs' claims 
against the tobacco companies in several ways. Not only are the 
damaging admissions coming from a tobacco company, but many 
more documents are now available to support plaintiffs' claims. 
Plaintiffs will also be able to argue, due to Liggett'S use of stronger 
warnings, that other tobacco companies are following a lower stan-
dard of care.259 All this places more pressure on the industry to fol-
low Liggett'S lead and join in an industry-wide settlement.260 
4. Jury Verdict Against Tobacco 
The theories of deceit and conspiracy, along with some of the 
new evidence, were at the center of plaintiff Grady Carter's case 
against Brown & Williamson.261 The sixty-five year old began smok-
ing prior to the enactment of the federal law requiring warning la-
bels on cigarette packages, and forty-three years later he developed 
lung cancer.262 Carter brought suit against Brown & Williamson 
based on negligence and strict liability, focusing on allegations that 
nicotine is addictive and that tobacco companies misled the pub-
lic.263 Carter's charges against Brown & Williamson were strength-
ened by evidence which included internal Brown & Williamson 
documents.264 
Jurors were angered by Brown & Williamson's hypocrisy in 
maintaining that smoking was safe while more and more of their 
own research revealed that it was in fact harmful,265 What resulted 
was the first jury verdict against a tobacco company. Carter was 
awarded $750,000.266 Perhaps this will be the first of many plaintiff 
victories in the third wave as a result of the pooling of resources 
and newly discovered evidence. 
258. See id. Many in the tobacco industry maintain that LeBow's settlement is 
merely an attempt to get another tobacco company to take over his failing 
company. See Schwartz & Torry, supra note 246, at A1. 
259. See Geyelin & Hwang, supra note 247, at A3. 
260. See infra text accompanying notes 267-77. 
261. See B&W, supra note 20. 
262. See Annas, supra note 184, at 306. 
263. See B&W, supra note 20. 
264. See Annas, supra note 184, at 306. This was the first case in which these docu-
ments were admitted into evidence. See id. 
265. See id. This anger was revealed in interviews with three of the six jurors. See 
id. 
266. See B&W, supra note 20. 
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5. Proposed National Settlement 
In mid-April 1997, an unprecedented effort to end the battle 
between plaintiffs and the tobacco industry became public.267 To-
bacco companies, including Philip Morris and RJ. Reynolds, en-
tered settlement talks with an anti-tobacco alliance comprised of 
states' attorney generals, plaintiffs' lawyers, and public health advo-
cates.268 By discussing a possible compromise with plaintiffs, the in-
dustry is acting in sharp contrast with its prior stance toward 
attackers.269 
On June 20, 1997, the negotiators emerged from discussions to 
announce that the tobacco industry and the alliance had reached 
an agreement.270 The tobacco industry agreed to pay $368.5 billion 
over the next twenty-five years,271 comply with advertising and mar-
keting restrictions,272 and submit to FDA regulation of nicotine.273 
The tobacco companies also agreed to take active and effective mea-
sures to reduce youth smoking.274 In exchange, tobacco companies 
267. See Mark Curriden, Litigants Talk Tobacco, 83 A.B.A. J. 20, 20 (1997). 
268. See id. at 21; see also Saundra Torry & John Schwartz, ~Tobacco Verdict Could 
Fire Up Negotiations far Liability Settlement, WASH. POST, May 6, 1997, at A9. 
269. See supra note 179. 
270. See John Schwartz & Saundra Torry, Tobacco Pact Calls far Strict Federal Controls, 
WASH. POST, June 21, 1997, at AI. 
271. See id.; see also Jill Smolowe, Sorry Pardner, nME, June 30, 1997, at 24, 25. Three 
hundred and eight billion dollars will be paid to settle the suits brought by 
the states and other class actions. See id. at 27. Sixty billion dollars of the set-
tlement is for punitive damages, of which $25 billion will be used for public-
health programs and health coverage for uninsured children. See id. The to-
bacco companies will also spend $500 million each year to fund anti-tobacco 
programs. See id. Many persons are especially surprised at the tobacco compa-
nies' agreement to pay $60 billion in punitive damages because it "is tanta-
mount to an admission of moral wrongdoing, a stunning development for an 
industry that for 40 years has steadfastly refused to admit any culpability or ac-
. cept any responsibility." [d. 
272. See Schwartz & Torry, supra note 270, at AI. The use of human images and 
cartoon characters in advertising is prohibited, as are billboards, product 
placements in films, and merchandise with company names or logos. See Smo-
lowe, supra note 271, at 25-27. The agreement also bans cigarette vending ma-
chines. See id. at 26. 
273. See Schwartz & Torry, supra note 270, at AI; see also Smolowe, supra note 271, 
at 25. The FDA is given authority over the ingredients in cigarettes, including 
the ability to ban nicotine after the year 2009. See Schwartz & Torry, supra 
note 270, at AI. 
274. See Schwartz & Torry, supra note 270, at AI. If under-age smoking does not 
drop by 30% in the next five years, 50% in seven years, and 60% in ten years, 
the industry will be fined $80 million for each percentage point short of the 
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received immunity from future class action suits, and payments to 
successful individual plaintiffs were limited to $5 billion a year.275 
However, Congress and the President must approve the sixty-eight 
page agreement before it becomes law.276 The agreement may not 
receive such backing. Early reviews of the proposed settlement have 
already spurred criticism and debate.277 
Even with its flaws, the proposed settlement signifies the strides 
plaintiffs have made in the long, hard battle against the tobacco 
companies. Armed with strong evidence, the coalition of states, 
plaintiffs' attorneys, and health advocates has proven to be a tough 
opponent for the tobacco industry. Instead of celebrating yet an-
other victory, tobacco companies are contemplating what steps to 
take as the possibility of enormous losses becomes increasingly real. 
Present day suits are now the cause of true concern for the indus-
try, as they never have been before. 
6. Settlement with Mississippi 
The industry'S decision to pay the state of Mississippi $3.6 bil-
lion is evidence of the tobacco companies' fears.278 As the July 9 
trial date for Mississippi's suit279 was fast approaching, the four larg-
target. See id. 
275. See id. The industry had been seeking complete immunity from current and 
future suits, but this was the cause of much debate and dissention among the 
anti-tobacco side. See id. Texas Attorney General Dan Moragels and others 
maintained that they would not be a party to a settlement that provides such 
immunity to an industry that "ha[s] lied to the public for 40 years." Curriden, 
supra note 267, at 21. Although short of blanket immunity, the $5 billion cap 
on what can be paid out annually provides the industry with predictability for 
stockholders, which has sent up the stock prices of Philip Morris and RJ. 
Reynolds. See Smolowe, supra note 271, at 24, 27. 
276. See Schwartz & Torry, supra note 270, at AI. 
277. See John Schwartz & Saundra Torry, Fine Print in Tobacco Pact Draws Critics, 
WASH. POST, June 22, 1997, at A9; see also Matthew L. Myers, Look at ... The 
Tobacco Settlement; Sign It; The Deal Will Save Lives Now-and in the Future, WASH. 
POST, June 29, 1997, at C3. 
278. See Milo Geyelin, Mississippi Becomes First State to Settle Suit Against Big Tobacco 
Companies, WALL ST. j., July 7, 1997, at B8. The companies will pay "3.6 billion 
over 25 years and $136 million a year indefinitely thereafter." Id. The first pay-
ment of $170 million will be paid July 15, 1997. See John Schwartz & Saundra 
Torry, Tobacco Firms, Mississippi Settle; State to Be Paid Nearly $3.4 Billion for Smok-
ing-Related Health Costs, WASH. POST, July 4, 1997, at AI, available in 1997 WL 
1192239. 
279. See Schwartz & Torry, supra note 277, at AI. 
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est tobacco companies28o agreed to settle with Mississippi for what 
amounts to be Mississippi's share of the $368.5 billion proposed na-
tional settlement.281 Therefore, even if the national agreement fails, 
the industry will never have to face Mississippi's charges in court. 282 
The suit that to many was not worth a nickel has now yielded 
billions.283 
IV. CONCLUSION 
During the 1950s, the battle against the tobacco industrY began 
with plaintiffs seeking recovery under deceit, breach of warranty, 
and negligence theories. Most of the first wave cases were easy victo-
ries for tobacco companies, but later cases like Green284 made the 
fight more difficult. 
In cases brought during the 1980s, plaintiffs argued that ciga-
rettes were "unreasonably dangerous" and failed the risk-utility test 
of strict liability.285 Again, tobacco companies defeated such attacks 
with the "freedom-of-choice" and assumption of risk defenses. 286 
During the second wave, tobacco companies also began asserting 
preemption defenses.287 
In Cipollone, the preemption issue went before the United 
States Supreme Court, which held only failure to warn claims were 
preempted,288 bringing us to the current era of litigation. To help 
ease the burden and cost of litigation, claims are now brought by 
teams of plaintiffs in class actions and state claims. The conspiracy 
theories being developed during the third wave are supported by re-
cently uncovered industry documents and insider testimony.289 Most 
recently, a jury decided in favor of a plaintiff in Carter v. Brown & 
280. Those companies include Philip Morris, RJ. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, 
and the Lorillard Tobacco Co. See id. 
281. See Geyelin, supra note 278, at B8. Mississippi is guaranteed payment by the to-
bacco companies even if the national proposal fails. See Schwartz & Torry, 
supra note 246, at AI. If the national agreement becomes law, however, it will 
supersede the Mississippi settlement. See Geyelin, supra note 278, at B8. 
282. Former attorney general of Maine, James E. Tierney, commented, "If you get 
to trial, all the truth comes out-and [the industry] can't stand that." 
Schwartz & Torry, supra note 246, at AI. 
283. See id. 
284. 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en bane). 
285. See' supra text accompanying notes 87-115. 
286. See supra text accompanying notes 116-26. 
287. See supra notes 129-48. 
288. See supra text accompanying notes 160-74. 
289. See supra notes 227-45. 
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Williamson. 290 In addition, the tobacco industry has agreed to a his-
toric settlement proposal with states' attorney generals.291 
Perhaps a more stable and lasting shift in views will place re-
sponsibility upon the tobacco companies for the harm inflicted by 
cigarettes. However, it must be remembered that when the first 
cases went to trial many assumed the tobacco industry would be eas-
ily defeated. lnstead, the industry has enjoyed over forty years of 
success. Even today, with the changing views of at least one jury and 
the industry's openness to compromise, the tobacco companies con-
tinue to sway some juries.292 There is a lot of work ahead before 
plaintiffs may achieve their lasting victory, but success now appears 
within reach. 
Ingrid L. Dietsch Field 
290. See supra text accompanying notes 261-66. 
291. See supra text accompanying notes 267-75; see also text accompanying notes 
278-83. 
292. On May 5, 1997, in Connor v. RJ Reynolds, a jury found that the tobacco com-
pany was not liable for the death of Jean Connor. See Donald P. Baker, Fla. 
Jury Finds RJ Reynolds Not Negligent; Tobacco Firm had Argued Smoking is Personal 
Choice, WASH. POST, May 6, 1997, at AI, available in 1997 WL 10691833. For 
over twenty years, Connor smoked up to three packs of cigarettes a day. See id. 
She died of lung cancer at the age of forty-nine, six months after filing suit. 
See id. Many were surprised at the defeat because of the success of the Carter 
case the year before. See id. However, some commentators reconciled the two 
verdicts by citing differences in the plaintiffs' behavior. See id. Carter "tried 
everything from hypnosis to a nicotine patch to stop smoking." See id. Con-
versely, Connor admitted knowledge of· the health risks associated with smok-
ing and did not try to quit until she was told she had cancer. See id. Others 
point to industry documents that were considered by the Carter jury, but were 
kept out in Connor. See id. As Matthew L. Myers of Campaign for Tobacco-Free 
Kids stated, "We've entered a new era in which plaintiffs will win some and 
companies will win some ... without either side dominating the other." Id. 
